So after seeing the country in an uproar about a few dead ducks (seriously, it isn't like we haven't got lots of them here), and hearing people complain about the environmental impact of the exploitation of Alberta's oilsands, I was able to get a first hand look.
First, let me give the nod to the environmentalists - yes, it's true. the complete destruction of the locales around the major plants in the region is absolutely staggering. It looks like a number of large smokestacks rising out of a desert - seriously.
But how many of you have actually been there, have actually seen the extents (and limits) of the so-called problem? Odds are, not very many. The fact is that it isn't that bad. Yes, the areas where the plants ARE are in a terrible environmental state. That said, the remainder of the areas AROUND where the plants are still exist as near pristine wilderness. Trees are alive and growing, as is wildlife.
So, to the doomsday prophets, I ask only that you take a few minutes and consider this - it's limited. It's VERY limited - the areas around the plants (once you get outside of the "desert" are still pristine wilderness. So, unless you've actually got something useful to say, please stick to hugging trees and stay the hell away from our economy.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Saturday, May 10, 2008
On War - my version
So one of the big deals in the last few years has been the issue of war in Iraq. It's been on the minds and tongues of just about anyone with a degree of political awareness, and a whole bunch of people who have none but like to hear themselves speak anyway. More recently, a discussion with a friend of mine in the army brought up the idea of being able to wage war through robotics via the click of a mouse, so I got to thinking about what was wrong with how we wage war.
I am not an anti-war advocate. Actually, I'm more of a pro-war advocate - but an advocate of smart war. War fought to win, and war fought to minimize casualties - both on our side, and on the opponents side, and war fought for reasonable, measurable policy objectives.
So what's wrong with how we wage war, and how can we make wars more efficient, and less costly in materiel and human life, while still protecting the policy objectives that we wage war to protect or enforce in the first place?
I think to answer that question that we need to look at a history of war - not a history of tactics and strategy, but a history of what war is. From time immemorial, wars have been fought between opposing armies on a battlefield of one form or another - from the trenches of Vimy Ridge or Paschendale, the jungles of Korea or Vietnam, to the desert of Afghanistan or Iraq, and even in the cities in Iraq, Kosovo, and even, to a certain extent, Ireland. These wars are won through the capture, death, or forced surrender of the opposing army - of necessity costing thousands of lives, but furthering the political will of the leadership of those armies. Essentially war is fought with a battlefield mentality that has remained unchanged over millenia, however has adapted itself as weapons modernize, and tactics with them.
So what options exist that would allow military leadership to escape the idea of a "battlefield" mentality? The one I would like to look at is a concept I will call a "covert ops" army. So what is such a force, and how would one operate? To answer this question, let's look at the current covert operations teams that exist. Using the Americans as an example, their special forces exist as the Navy SEALS, the Army Rangers, the Green Berets, and the Airborne units - in all respects troops exquisitely trained in covert warfare, and supported as needed by the main branches of the army. These forces are generally used in counter-terror operations, as well as covert/intelligence ops abroad. So how does one fight a war with a force made up of these well trained, well equipped foot soldiers?
How does one kill a snake? Remove the head, and the snake quickly dies. Do the same with an army or a government, and the government, like the snake, quickly dies. Let's further this concept by looking at modern war, but considering a "covert ops war" on the ground. We keep, as our standing army, an elite unit comprising soldiers trained and equipped for covert infiltration, execution, and extraction. Rather than sending our tanks, infantry, artillery, etc in to fight and destroy our enemies armour, infantry, artillery, etc, would we not be better to use the covers of silence and darkness to take down the command structure of the opposing forces - both in the field and at the office? Why not carry that a couple of steps further and use the same strategy to take the leadership of the belligerant power? Ultimately, this change in overall wartime strategy should lead to both a reduced financial cost for a state at war, as well as a significant reduction in loss of life - civillian and military - for all parties involved.
In the end, this strategy comes through two concepts not unknown to combat operations - speed and stealth. Victory through a covert strategy requires a number of factors. First, the operations against the opposition have to go of within a short period of time - striking down the odd person here or there will leave the opposition too much time to find a replacement for that person or those few people. Taking down a larger number of targets in a limited time frame allows for a much smaller response time for the opposition, allowing both for greater disruption to their military operations, as well as a greater chance of successful escape of your own operatives. Second, a sufficient number of operations actually have to succeed to sufficiently destabilize the nations government and military structure to not allow them the option of continuing their belligerance.
Sun Tzu spoke of the value of surprise and stealth many times throughout his treatise - this is, I believe, the logical conclusion of that.
I am not an anti-war advocate. Actually, I'm more of a pro-war advocate - but an advocate of smart war. War fought to win, and war fought to minimize casualties - both on our side, and on the opponents side, and war fought for reasonable, measurable policy objectives.
So what's wrong with how we wage war, and how can we make wars more efficient, and less costly in materiel and human life, while still protecting the policy objectives that we wage war to protect or enforce in the first place?
I think to answer that question that we need to look at a history of war - not a history of tactics and strategy, but a history of what war is. From time immemorial, wars have been fought between opposing armies on a battlefield of one form or another - from the trenches of Vimy Ridge or Paschendale, the jungles of Korea or Vietnam, to the desert of Afghanistan or Iraq, and even in the cities in Iraq, Kosovo, and even, to a certain extent, Ireland. These wars are won through the capture, death, or forced surrender of the opposing army - of necessity costing thousands of lives, but furthering the political will of the leadership of those armies. Essentially war is fought with a battlefield mentality that has remained unchanged over millenia, however has adapted itself as weapons modernize, and tactics with them.
So what options exist that would allow military leadership to escape the idea of a "battlefield" mentality? The one I would like to look at is a concept I will call a "covert ops" army. So what is such a force, and how would one operate? To answer this question, let's look at the current covert operations teams that exist. Using the Americans as an example, their special forces exist as the Navy SEALS, the Army Rangers, the Green Berets, and the Airborne units - in all respects troops exquisitely trained in covert warfare, and supported as needed by the main branches of the army. These forces are generally used in counter-terror operations, as well as covert/intelligence ops abroad. So how does one fight a war with a force made up of these well trained, well equipped foot soldiers?
How does one kill a snake? Remove the head, and the snake quickly dies. Do the same with an army or a government, and the government, like the snake, quickly dies. Let's further this concept by looking at modern war, but considering a "covert ops war" on the ground. We keep, as our standing army, an elite unit comprising soldiers trained and equipped for covert infiltration, execution, and extraction. Rather than sending our tanks, infantry, artillery, etc in to fight and destroy our enemies armour, infantry, artillery, etc, would we not be better to use the covers of silence and darkness to take down the command structure of the opposing forces - both in the field and at the office? Why not carry that a couple of steps further and use the same strategy to take the leadership of the belligerant power? Ultimately, this change in overall wartime strategy should lead to both a reduced financial cost for a state at war, as well as a significant reduction in loss of life - civillian and military - for all parties involved.
In the end, this strategy comes through two concepts not unknown to combat operations - speed and stealth. Victory through a covert strategy requires a number of factors. First, the operations against the opposition have to go of within a short period of time - striking down the odd person here or there will leave the opposition too much time to find a replacement for that person or those few people. Taking down a larger number of targets in a limited time frame allows for a much smaller response time for the opposition, allowing both for greater disruption to their military operations, as well as a greater chance of successful escape of your own operatives. Second, a sufficient number of operations actually have to succeed to sufficiently destabilize the nations government and military structure to not allow them the option of continuing their belligerance.
Sun Tzu spoke of the value of surprise and stealth many times throughout his treatise - this is, I believe, the logical conclusion of that.
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